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Abstract: If philosophy in the wake of Kant’s transcendental revolution tends to orient itself around a 
subjective principle, namely the human subject, then recently various schools of thought have proposed
a counter-revolution in which philosophy is given an objective, non-human starting point. In this 
historical context, ‘object-oriented ontology’ has sought to gain the status of first philosophy by 
identifying being in general with the object as such—that is, by systematically converting beings to 
objects. By tracing the provenance of contemporary object-oriented philosophy to a key moment of late
18th-century German philosophy, this paper develops the idea of the difference between being and 
object in order to demonstrate that object-oriented thinking, contrary to its anti-Kantian claims, adheres
to the central axiom of transcendental idealism, that this axiom is an unsolvable paradox, and that Kant 
and Novalis give us the resources for a transformative philosophical project that meets the challenge of 
the cultural and theoretical turn to objects.
On the Difference Between Being and Object
James Osborn
For it is vain to assume an artificial indifference concerning inquiries the object of 
which cannot be indifferent to human nature.
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason1




This paper is an inquiry into the difference between being and object. It is expected that, before getting 
to the heart of the subject matter, one should introduce the topic with preliminary remarks to orient the 
reader and a direct presentation of the thesis to be demonstrated, so that a secure course is charted out 
beforehand. That is, the starting point for our topic is to be conditioned by the object of our philosophy,
and the introduction must itself already achieve the goal of the whole work. Our particular object has 
set for us quite the formidable task: to present the difference between being and object in the manner of
being as no longer merely an object. Further, since “being” refers to that with which we must already 
be familiar and itself the way by which we would search for it, we can claim no indifference to this 
difference. In philosophy, not mere ideas but nature itself and we ourselves in our nature are implicated,
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and the subject is always inextricably caught up with the fate of the object. We come upon a striking 
thesis: if the difference between being and object exists, then that difference must be realized in the 
philosophical practice that would search for it—and if philosophy is to think being beyond the domain 
of objects, this entails that the philosopher is to be no longer a mere subject. Thus, the goal of our 
philosophy is not only discursive but also transformative. If the difference between being and object is 
to be sought, the overturning of the domain of objects in general is to be experienced.
Where is the domain in which objects and subjects come into being? What is their 
unconditioned ground? How could we ever begin the search for such a non-objective “object”? How 
could we achieve such a standpoint without being familiar with it, and how could we come to know it 
without first achieving it? One might recognize this as the perennial problem of establishing a 
foundational principle: where does philosophy begin? More troubling still for us, the topic of this paper
questions the traditional starting points, as the task of our investigation rules out the object, while our 
transformative thesis rules out the subject. The impasse that appears to impede our inquiry from its 
very inception is captured in the following thought experiment.
 We are searching for the difference between being and object. The object of our search is the 
difference, or being insofar as it is not an object. But if we have made the difference the object of our 
search, we have already determined it to be such an object, and our search is ipso facto a proof of the 
identity of being and object, not their difference. Philosophy, in the very act of its search for being, is 
the proof of the non-existence of the difference between being and object. The search ends the moment 
it begins. If, however, the difference between being and object truly exists, then being insofar as it is 
not an object could not be an object of any inquiry, and it would be impossible to ever begin our search.
We cannot begin a search for something whose nature precludes it from being the object of a search. It 
seems, then, that there are only two conclusions possible: our inquiry is either unnecessary—for in the 
mere act of positing being as the object of philosophy we already know that the difference does not 
exist and we need not search for it—or impossible—because the difference, as existing, and being what
it is, could not be the object of our inquiry. This dilemma threatens to lure thought into a conceptual 
snare that would destine philosophy to inaction. Everywhere we search for being, but we only ever find 
objects.
Faced with the worldview from which everything is an object and aspects of existence are 
properties of objects, a philosophical investigation of being now appears obsolete. We will thus have to 
overcome this object-oriented worldview in order to get to our goal, i.e., we will have to pass through 
the identity of being and object on the way to their difference, and this not as a mere theoretical 
exercise but as a practical need grown out of the everyday reduction of beings to objects in a post-
Kantian information-technological world. Therefore, this paper presents the following three movements
aimed to clear a path through the passage from object to being. First, we turn to the school of thought 
that claims to represent the standpoint of objects and ask what an object-orientation means for 
philosophy and for a search for being. Second, we will find that what is at stake in object-oriented 
thought is not objects per se but a division of nature into subjects and objects that is axiomatic for 
philosophy since Kantian transcendental idealism, and Kant will aid us in wresting this axiom from the 
shadows. Third, though in Kant we find the difference latent in conceptual form, it is Novalis through 
his interpretation of Kantian philosophy who will teach us how to carry out the concept toward the 
achievement of our transformative thesis. Finally, each of these movements in its own way is guided by
the idea that the object of philosophy makes a difference to the philosopher and that the philosopher 
cannot be indifferent to the object of philosophy. This idea, when put into practice, is the philosophical 
proof of being beyond the dialectical conflict between subjects and objects, and for this reason it 
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constitutes the dissolution both of the classic “paradox of inquiry” and of object-oriented thinking. In 
this way, we aim to demonstrate that the “object” of philosophy is being not object, and that as such the
idea of philosophy entails the transformation of the philosopher and philosophical practice.
II. The Identity of Being and Object
We begin with what appears as the most natural starting point in an object-driven world, with the 
theoretical expression of that world in what is called “object-oriented ontology.” The goal of this 
speculative metaphysics is exactly what its name suggests: an onto-logy according to a system of 
objects, or, a logic of being as object. Object-oriented ontology says that the object in itself (in 
opposition to the subject) is the unconditioned principle and proper concern of philosophy and, 
therefore, that the search for being (insofar as it is not object) is either impossible or irrelevant. But this
central doctrine of object-oriented ontology produces an unattainable goal and a duplicitous thesis: for 
the identity of being and object entails an indifference between subject and object, an unbridgeable gap 
between philosopher and philosophical task. And if the central doctrine of object-oriented ontology can
be shown to be unattainable and duplicitous, this would mean not only the failure of the idea of an 
object-oriented philosophy but, more importantly, a path will be opened toward the difference between 
being and object, since it was the object-oriented worldview that threatened to stall our inquiry by 
reducing every possible starting point to an object. If the identity of being and object does not stand up 
to scrutiny, then the paradox of the inquiry into being insofar as it is not object immediately dissolves. 
Thus, to better understand what is at stake in this thesis and what it means for our search for the 
difference, we will look briefly at the thought of the recent founder and popularizer of object-oriented 
philosophy, Graham Harman.
The origin of Harman’s turn to objects is his encounter with Heidegger in Tool-Being, which 
marks a crucial point in Heidegger scholarship and in contemporary philosophy in general. Some of its 
conclusions with regard to Being and Time seem so foreign to the views commonly attributed to 
Heidegger that followers of the latter are tempted to reject it as either a misunderstanding or an 
intentional spoof of the question of being. But any out of hand dismissal of Harman’s project would 
miss an opportunity to follow the trail of a formidable challenge to the Heideggerian canon toward a 
positive thinking anew of the relevance of the Seinsfrage for philosophy. Because it identifies a formal 
resemblance between being and object, Harman’s object-oriented ontology brings “being” to its 
conceptual boundary and, for this reason, provides a point from which the non-objective dimensionality
of being can be thought.
Harman says that there is a “latent subjectivism” in the common readings of Being and Time, 
provoked at times by Heidegger himself, that tends to limit the Seinsfrage and the analysis of existence 
(Dasein) to human praxis, to give priority to the human standpoint and reference everything back to a 
human Dasein.3 The consequence is that objects themselves are excluded from transcendence, which is 
solely assigned to Dasein and, at times, to the things of Dasein’s world. Dasein’s transcendence, the 
“nihilating ‘not’ between being and beings,” so the argument goes, passes over and negates non-Dasein 
entities. Dasein, as subject and observer, “nihilates” objects themselves, conforms beings always to and
for itself and its being.4 Further, the tendency of Heidegger and his interpreters to reference everything 
back to Dasein is only a modified version of a key trait of the Kantian revolution: “a deep suspicion of 
any attempt to philosophize about anything beyond the pale of human experience.”5 Harman wants to 
counter this subjective strain of thought—both in Heidegger and in contemporary philosophy in general
—by assigning being and transcendence to objects. His goal is thus to formalize the central insights of 
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Heidegger’s philosophy into an ontology that no longer needs to make any explicit reference to Dasein 
or the human being, an ontology which would serve as the foundation of a counter-revolution to Kant’s 
critical-transcendental philosophy. He wants to filter out all traces of the effects of subjectivity in order 
to allow objects themselves to stand on their own and to be thought on their own terms. Harman’s 
“objects” are thus “entities considered in their liberation from the contexture,” i.e., from the world of 
meanings and ready-to-hand things in which Dasein always finds itself thrown.6 That which belongs to 
being in general is to be “inscribed in things” themselves as objects, considered in isolation.7 Harman 
must distill the “internal mechanism” of Heidegger’s “central discovery, a discovery that has no need 
for any special human entity,” and apply this mechanism to things in general as mechanical objects.8
The discovery to which all the details of the Seinsfrage point is what Harman calls Heidegger’s 
“two world theory,” found in the tool analysis of Being and Time.9 In short, “the meaning of being is 
tool-being,” says Harman, the “reversal” between the two modes of every entity, Zuhandenheit (ready-
to-handness) and Vorhandenheit (present-at-handness), the dual sense of every object as in-itself and 
appearance, withdrawn and visible.10 Harman takes this system of tools and equipment to be 
universally applicable—“Equipment is global; beings are tool-beings”—and since there is no 
ontological difference between human beings and any other types of entities, for being in general 
means only every entity’s “reversal” between its two modes, he bids us to think objects, instead of 
Dasein, as the true agents of being.11 We will not go into the details of these modes of being or of 
Heidegger’s analysis of tools, as I trust the reader is already familiar with these and the commentaries 
and interpretations thereon. The point for us here is that Harman takes the question of the meaning of 
being to be a question about the being of objects, and his answer is that their being is “tool-being,” or 
the endless “reversal” between Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit. By objectifying the dual sense of the 
“object” of Dasein’s experience, being, Harman claims to have found a way to reinterpret the whole 
Heideggerian corpus without explicit need for the interpreter, Dasein—a way to think being without 
thought and a strategy for displacing the human from philosophical inquiry. In thus relocating the 
domain of fundamental ontology from Dasein to objects in general, Harman projects the meaning of 
being onto a metaphysical field of Dasein-like entities that are nevertheless unrelated to the Dasein that 
originally experienced the question of being.
However, to achieve his overcoming of the subject and turn to being as object, Harman must 
make several moves that call into question the goal of his philosophy and the very possibility of the 
identity of being and object. First, the ontological difference, the difference between being and beings 
that for Heidegger is a key to the non-dialectical nature of being, must be turned on its head. Instead of 
drawing our attention to the transcendence of beings with respect to their reduction to present-at-
handness, instead of bidding us to consider beings out of their being undetermined by objectivity and 
thinghood, in object-oriented ontology the difference is interpreted from the side of beings already 
taken in their being to be objects. The difference becomes a mechanism internal to beings as objects, 
i.e., the same as their “tool-being”: the opposition between Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit is 
“precisely the same as that between ontological and ontic.”12 This definition of difference as a property 
of objects is problematic for his goal to find in Heidegger an alternative to the Kantian revolution, 
because Harman’s projection of ontological difference, which for Heidegger is proper to being, onto a 
field of objects reveals an implicit reliance on exactly that which he would aim to overcome: a Kantian 
dialectical concept of difference. In an effort to isolate objects in their being from all human relation, 
the “ontological gap” that haunts all things becomes “the difference between things in themselves and 
any presentation of them,” a “permanent dualism” between the noumena and phenomena of every 
object.13 Second, Harman’s ontology brings the focus of philosophy away from a multidimensional 
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sense of being toward being as formal or mere being, a move that will become critical for us later. For 
now it is sufficient to note that where Heidegger differentiates between something as “absolute” and the
same as “formal” or “theoretical,” Harman conflates these meanings. That is, for Heidegger the most 
fundamental and universal meaning of being must be related to “lived experience,” namely, “the index 
for the highest potentiality of life” and “the fullness of life itself,” but for Harman it is that of science, 
namely, precisely the “formally objective” meaning that lifts something out of lived experience.14 
Third, since it defines ontological difference dialectically, from the side of beings taken as objects, and 
because the being of such beings is mere being, object-oriented ontology entails a contradictory 
determination of that same being that practices its science (i.e., the philosopher). Dasein can only be a 
topic of concern for object-oriented philosophy insofar as the being of Dasein is taken in its formal 
sense of the mere “is,” stripped of understanding and any relation to objects of philosophical activity. 
Because all objects are Dasein, all transcend, the concern of philosophy is no longer the peculiar 
transcendence of Dasein but the formal-grammatical operation of the “is” of all objects.15 In attempting 
to counteract the subjectivist strain in Heidegger, Harman overreacts and throws objects over and 
against all human relation, with the effect that being is no longer essentially related to understanding, 
which means that the object of philosophy is no longer related to the philosopher.16 “Equipment,” 
which for Harman is “tool-being” or being in general, “is an autonomous province that could hardly 
care less about Dasein.”17 Thus, object-oriented ontology establishes the domain of philosophy as a 
province of indifference, and anywhere that Heidegger would broach the subject of Dasein’s care or 
responsibility, any sign of a relation between the philosopher and the object of philosophy, Harman 
must convert such traces of philosophical praxis into an ontological logic to which Dasein has no 
significant relation.18 Object-oriented ontology thus entails the duplicitous thesis that the philosopher is
indifferent to the object of philosophy.
In summary, Harman wants to ask the question of the meaning of being without reference to the 
beings for whom that question is meaningful, and being in general becomes synonymous with a logic 
of being in which the philosopher has no interest. If this formulation of the goal of Harman’s 
philosophy seems contradictory, it is because I want to draw our attention to a central problem of 
object-oriented philosophy: in flattening and formalizing the ontological difference such that it can 
serve as an internal logic of things as objects, a great many beings and things are passed over, not the 
least of which are us and our ability to translate Harman at all. When reference to a dimension of 
being beyond its mere form is explicitly forbidden from the start, a genuinely philosophical 
engagement and understanding is proscribed, since the philosopher must restrict her thought and her 
being to the two dimensions of being as object. To achieve its goal, Harman’s object-oriented 
philosophy must employ words such as “being” and “object” with no concern for their meaning. 
Whereas for Heidegger “being” is overloaded with meaning, and the task of philosophy is to seek the 
full dimensionality of that meaning (“the highest potentiality of life”), even when that task takes Dasein
beyond its own projected meanings, in object-oriented ontology words must be, as Harman says, 
“liberated” from all contexture. In strict adherence to Harman’s goal, then, the system of object-
oriented ontology is meaningless.19 This passing over of beings and meanings toward objects and their 
mechanisms, this “nihilating” difference through which Harman translates Heidegger’s question of 
being, is the founding transcendental gesture of all object-oriented thought and thus the meaning of the
turn to objects in the information-technological age.
What we learn from Harman is that in order to achieve the identity of being and object, object-
oriented ontology must have already made a decision about the meaning of being. Being is determined 
as pure form, mere being, cut off from any non-dialectical dimensionality of being. Harman’s objects 
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are truly Gegen-stände, against and in opposition to the subject and any other being that would not 
reduce to the mechanism of objects, to the logic of “tool-being.” His turn to objects is not a critique of 
the primacy of the human subject—a critique already explicit throughout Heidegger’s thought—but a 
denial of the human relation to being. In other words, Harman’s “liberation” of objects from the 
contexture is a revolt against Da-sein itself, that is, a “being against” the possibility of “being there” in 
a transformative relation between being and beings, and “objects” and “subjects.” As such, Harman 
abandons the sense behind every relational description of being in the Heideggerian corpus, e.g., In-
der-velt-Sein, Mit-Sein, Seinsverständnis, Ereignis.
This has not only theoretical but also practical consequences for Harman, for it frustrates his 
own central thesis. For example, it is typical of Harman’s reading of Heidegger that he makes arguably 
correct, and often insightful, assertions about the meaning of being, while at the same time showing a 
complete lack of awareness of the relation of those assertions to the surrounding sentences and to his 
own object-oriented perspective. So in conclusion to his critique of Dreyfus, Harman gives a lucid and 
plausible formulation of the transcendence of being in general with respect to human machinations: 
“[For Heidegger] the problem with presence-at-hand is not that it claims to exist outside of human 
contexts. The problem is that what exists outside of human contexts does not have the mode of being of
presence-at-hand.”20 And yet in the surrounding paragraphs he defends an account of being as object in
the sense of thing-in-itself cut off from subjects, which to all but Harman means precisely a present-at-
hand-style determination of being within a schematic of the philosopher. Which schema? It could not 
be more obvious and uncontroversial that the schema in play in object-oriented ontology is that which 
first gives the “object” and “thing-in-itself” the definition which Harman relies on: the subject-object 
schema of the Kantian Kritik. Not only does Harman’s attempt at a naïve view of objects to which the 
philosopher must be indifferent lead to a text in which there is no coherence between one sentence and 
the next nor between its form and content, but, further, one of the principle goals of his project—to 
provide an alternative to the Kantian transcendental schematization of reality—is discredited by his 
choice of a determinative plan for his ontology, namely, that plan according to which being is one term 
in the subject-object conflict. As such, object-oriented ontology assumes an antagonism between the 
philosopher (taken as “subject”) and the first principle of philosophy (taking as “object”), and thus the 
practice it cultivates is not a love (philosophy) but a transcendental logic (science) of its object, being.
Like all such sciences, the science of being as object must proceed according to a path secured 
in advance, an original determination of being that solves its own conflict and guarantees the success of
the entire edifice. The transcendental gesture required for the identity of being and object reveals a 
decision space in which objects, and by extension subjects, come into being. This encounter with 
Harman and object-oriented ontology in our search for the difference between being and object leads us
through their identity to the decision in which being is determined in advance according to a plan. With
its turn to objects over against subjects and its rejection of a non-objective relation to being, the plan 
according to which object-oriented ontology determines the identity of being and object is called the 
subject-object schema. Could it be, then, that Harman’s turn to objects, which was supposed to offer an 
alternative to the “philosophy of access” and subjectivism that flourished in light of the Kantian 
revolution, actually shares a common origin and plan with Kant’s attempt to found philosophy as a 
science of transcendental subjectivity? If so, then our search for the difference between being and 
object leads us beyond not only objects but the whole domain of the subject-object conflict. In the 
coming into being of this domain we should find that which is yet unconditioned by the schema—a 
dimension of being beyond objects and, therefore, a proof of the existence of the difference.
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III. The Provenance of the Subject-Object Schema
Our inquiry leads us to the provenance of that domain in which being is divided up into subjects and 
objects, and for that we must return to Kant, because although the subject-object schema can be traced 
back further historically, to Descartes and even earlier, Kant makes this schema the foundation of an 
entire methodological edifice for philosophy and thus brings what is at stake in it to a singular clarity of
expression. The goal of Kantian philosophy, as announced in the preface to the second edition of the 
Critique of Pure Reason, is to put philosophy on a secure foundation like science. What characterizes 
modern science, says Kant, is that it conforms nature to human reason and frames its results according 
to rational principles—or said differently, because reason already conforms an object of knowledge to 
itself in some way, science directs itself toward nature explicitly according to the dictates of reason.21 
Because we can then always be sure that the results of science will conform to some rational plan, 
science enjoys a secure path (sicheren Gang), able to operate from clear and certain principles. Thus, 
nature is taken to be “the sum total of the objects of experience,”22 and the question of the being of 
nature apart from the relationship to a rational subject is foreclosed. Nature as the object of knowledge 
comes into being concurrently with the human being as knowing subject, determining the terms 
according to which reason compels nature to answer becomes the method of transcendental critique, 
and the subject-object schema that defines much of the discourse of Kantian (and post-Kantian) 
philosophy is thus laid out.
Yet, there is a problem, which is given in the opening words of the first edition: “Our reason has
the peculiar fate that, with reference to one class of its knowledge, it is always troubled by questions 
which it cannot ignore because they are prescribed by the very nature of reason itself, and which it 
cannot answer because they transcend the powers of human reason.”23 The peculiar fate of reason is 
that, despite its knowledge being limited to objects as they are given to us, it seeks knowledge of 
objects as they are in themselves. Reason searches for something that it cannot find. We everywhere 
seek an absolute ground beyond experience, an unconditioned source of things and their conditions, 
and in this search reason posits something beyond its purview, it pretends to turn into an object of 
investigation that which cannot be such an object at all. This should be troubling to us, because in 
positing an object which cannot be known, that is, an object which cannot be an object of philosophy as
science and of the philosopher as rational subject, philosophy is put in the peculiar and embarrassing 
situation of having no firm ground from which to progress with certainty and clarity in its knowledge.
That Kant grounds his project in this peculiar and troubling nature of human reason gives us 
insight into, not only the structure, method, and ultimate meaning of transcendental philosophy, but 
also the provenance of the subject-object schema in general. First, the structure and method of the 
Critique can be derived from the original transcendental differentiation of the world into nature and 
object, on the one hand, and human beings and rational subject, on the other. We call it “original” 
because it is “a priori” with respect to all experiences of subjectivity and objectivity; it is 
“transcendental” both in the strictly Kantian sense, i.e., as the condition of possibility of knowledge, 
and because it is the necessary first act of the transcendental subject, and it thus always marks the 
moment of the coming into being of transcendental philosophy. Second, the very act of this 
differentiation entails the positing of a “supersensible” realm of the thing-in-itself. That we conceive of 
our knowledge as a representative relationship necessitates an object with a dual sense, for although our
knowledge be limited to objects as they appear to us, we cannot help but ask about the status of those 
objects as they are in themselves. Thus, in order to put philosophy on the secure path of science, Kant 
must always and everywhere establish “the necessary distinction” between things as objects of the 
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knowing subject, and things-in-themselves, and the central “teaching” of his criticism becomes this: “to
take an object in two senses.”24 Thought from the side of the subject, this is the difference between 
knowing and thinking; while thought from the side of the object, this is what we could call the doctrine
of the binary object. In other words, our determination of nature according to the relation between 
object and subject produces a third term, and the unknowable thing-in-itself, the object cut off from the 
subject, is an artifact of the coming into being of the subject-object schema. Though he try to tame its 
spirit in the Transcendental Dialectic by providing a solution to reason’s conflict with itself, the thing-
in-itself haunts every move of Kant’s philosophy. Third, this transcendental differentiation and 
determination of nature precedes the Critique, even though in Kant’s thought it takes on an explicit, 
methodological role for philosophy. It can be traced back to the arrival of the modern scientific 
worldview and, even further, to a certain aspect of the nature of human beings themselves. In his 
attempt to found philosophy as a science of the human as rational being, Kant develops the subject-
object schema and its consequences more clearly than any other thinker, and, for this reason, Kantian 
philosophy also points beyond this original transcendental division to its provenance.
What exactly is, then, the provenance of the transcendental determination of nature according to
the subject-object schema? If we have said, following Kant, that we can trace it back to human nature 
as expressed in modern science, then it would be tempting to conclude that the subject-object schema is
the most natural expression of the human drive to know, and that philosophy equipped with this 
framework would best be able to comprehend everything that is. It would be left to us only to decide 
between the subjective and objective sides, to determine which is more true to being. These are the 
terms under which much of philosophy since Kant has operated, and this is the crossroads at which we 
part ways with the subject-oriented schools of thought and with Harman’s alternative. For while 
Harman remains within the Kantian transcendental differentiation, merely reversing its polarity and 
determining being in favor of the object, we however are compelled to go beyond this entire dialectic 
itself and search for its coming into being. We are guided by the truest of scientific intentions, to trace 
back the conditions of things to their cause, to not rest until we reach the ground of all such 
determinations of being. The subject-object schema comes into being and determines being—to what 
does this fact point?
The answer is there in the Critique wherever Kant’s concern is reason’s conflict with itself over 
the ultimate status of the determinate things of experience. What compels us into this peculiar and 
troubling situation of human nature—the subject-object schema of knowledge coupled with a 
contradictory desire to go beyond—is what Kant calls das Unbedingte, which for the moment we will 
translate as “the unconditioned.” It occupies a unique dual role in Kant’s thought as both source and 
goal of philosophical activity. Our reason, he says, demands that we go beyond appearances and search 
for the unconditioned in things-in-themselves (Dingen an sich), in order that the endless regression of 
the series of conditions (Bedingungen) among conditioned things (Bedingten) may find rest.25 The 
unconditioned is both that which compels us to go beyond the realm of appearances (i.e., of knowledge 
as the relation between subject and object) and that “alone which reason is looking for.”26 Further, as 
the unconditioned in the chain of conditions of all conditioned things, it is the ultimate reason for the 
totality of things in general and their thingly character. But, Kant will say, we do not find the 
unconditioned anywhere—it “can never be met with in experience” for we only ever find conditions 
and conditioned things.27 Though our searching for it produces the illusion of knowledge of a thing-in-
itself, we are always “directed only at appearances and must leave the thing in itself as real for itself but
unknown to us.”28 The unconditioned leads us to think, to posit, that which we cannot know, and, 
therefore, the unconditioned is the reason why reason is constantly in conflict with itself over 
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transcendental ideas, and why critical philosophy must guard against transcendental illusions which 
pretend to find the unconditioned in objects as things in-themselves.
With the unconditioned, we arrive at a turning point which will determine much of post-Kantian
philosophy as well as be a key to the resolution of the central problem of our investigation. For despite 
Kant’s attempt to subject the unconditioned to the rigors of critical method and confine its meaning to 
the realm of the transcendental subject, he at times suggests a different prioritization, namely, that the 
transcendental subject is derivative of the unconditioned. Thus, his use of das Unbedingte in Book II of
the Transcendental Dialectic equivocates between two perspectives: that of the transcendental (the 
difference between subject and object) and that of the transcendent (beyond the transcendental 
differentiation). On the one side, the unconditioned is a product of the transcendental subject: the goal 
of dialectic, that highest of ideas toward which reason is compelled, and it constitutes the totality of 
conditions for objects of experience.29 Yet on the other side, it seems to precede transcendental 
subjectivity, for the unconditioned is the source of what Kant earlier called our “peculiar fate”: the 
“natural and inevitable dialectic” that is “inseparable from human reason.”30 Kant further concedes with
Plato that transcendental ideas appear as “original causes of things,” even of “nature itself.”31 Now, one 
could interpret this latter definition within the bounds of the former, i.e., within the schematic of 
transcendental subjectivity, and keep philosophy on the “secure path” of transcendental-critical method 
by filtering the unconditioned, as Kant does to Plato’s ideas, through the strict distinction between 
objects as they can be known by us and objects as they are in themselves. But one could also step back 
from the whole Kantian transcendental realm and into the “unconditioned” space of, not, to be clear, 
objects or things-in-themselves, but the coming into being of subjects and objects at all. In other words,
we find that Kant’s unconditioned mediates between “transcendental” and “transcendent” meanings of 
the ideas of reason, and insofar as it is a transcendent principle, it is the tendency of human reason to 
transgress the limits of the realm of experience of the transcendental subject and “to claim a perfectly 
new territory which does not recognize any demarcation at all.”32 Either way, it is clear that for Kant 
the unconditioned is a necessary principle of reason, and, for that reason, in its role as the highest aim 
of human thought in general, it is also the inevitable object of philosophy.
It would be an error at this point to assume that, because Kant gives a critique of pure reason 
and of its transcendental ideas, he does not affirm but denies the centrality of the unconditioned to the 
task of philosophy. Whereas he would dispense with it, we are attempting to force it back in. This 
objection, though understandable, is misplaced, for it confuses what Kant sometimes says and what he 
actually does. It is precisely because for Kant all knowledge eventually leads to the unconditioned, 
leading from sensibility to the rules and concepts of the understanding to the ordering and synthesis of 
these around a principle, that the critique of pure reason is necessary. Indeed, Kant is interested in 
giving a foundation for philosophy as scientific knowledge, but to do this he devotes half the Kritik to 
an explication of the nature and role of ideas and principles, i.e., to the unconditioned with respect to 
the conditions of knowledge, and this not because he would have them out of the way and done with, 
but rather because these lie in the nature of human thinking itself, and they lead to error insofar as they 
are taken for granted and not made the explicit object of philosophical inquiry. In other words, the 
unconditioned is the natural object of human thinking and, whatever else it might do, philosophy must 
be concerned with the unconditioned, whether implicitly or explicitly. It is Kant’s idea of philosophy, 
demonstrated in the very practice and results of the Kritik, that the success of philosophy as a science 
depends on the preliminary, foundational work of making the nature of human thinking in its highest 
ordering principle an explicit concern. Now, whether the principles and ideas of philosophy are taken to
be transcendent or transcendental, whether they are mistaken for things themselves, is another question,
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one which will occupy much of post-Kantian philosophy. But what is never under question in Kant is 
whether human thinking, and consequently philosophy, naturally and necessarily seeks the 
unconditioned. And while Kant proscribes the transcendent use of the ideas of reason, and the task of 
the Transcendental Dialectic is to demonstrate the error of interpreting the peculiar tendency of reason 
toward the unconditioned as a determination of things themselves, he says nothing, however, about the 
meaning of the Unbedingte as transcendent with respect to the entire transcendental realm. Indeed, he 
cannot say anything in this regard, because he does not think the provenance of the subject-object 
schema as an original transcendental differentiation of nature which always and everywhere is already 
decided in the Critique.
What we mean by the transcendence of the unconditioned, then, is something more than what 
Kant means; we are no longer speaking of a move within the framework of the dual sense of an object 
over and against a subject. Rather, we are speaking of this unconditioned with regard to the series of 
conditions of Kantian philosophy, which extends to the original transcendental differentiation of nature 
into objective and subjective aspects for the purpose of its being known according to certain principles. 
Thinking the transcendence of the unconditioned thusly, in a way that is suggested by but goes beyond 
Kant’s definition, das Unbedingte could be understood from the perspective of the indeterminacy out of
which nature is first determined as subject and object, and thus the unconditioned would not be an 
artifact of the rational subject but would approach something more like being in general.
It is of no small significance, then, that immediately following this account of the dual meaning 
of the unconditioned as both transcendental, in that it must be interpreted within the bounds of 
transcendental subjectivity, and transcendent, in that it compels us to transgress those bounds, Kant 
attempts a definition of the “absolute.” It is the absolute nature of the unconditioned that most clearly 
demonstrates the conflict at the heart of Kantian philosophy, and it will be the key to our transition 
from the transcendental realm of the subject-object schema to the unconditioned realm of being in 
general. Kant makes a distinction between two uses of the term “absolute,” insisting that only one is 
true to the idea of the absolute: on the one hand, it can refer to “a thing considered in itself,” or “that 
which is possible in itself”; on the other, it can mean something considered “without limitation,” or 
“that which is possible in all respects, in any relation.” The former is “the least that could be said of an 
object,” while the latter is “the most that can be said of the possibility of a thing.”33 Kant then says of 
these two meanings of “absolute” that their difference is “infinitely wide” (sind sie unendlich weit 
auseinander), and that the preservation of this difference cannot be of indifference to philosophers 
concerned with that to which the term refers.34 Indeed, this decision about the absolute nature of the 
unconditioned will take center stage in many of the crucial debates of post-Kantian philosophy, and, as 
we will soon see, be the key to the nature of the subject-object schema and its transformation into the 
difference between being and object.
We now arrive at a crossroads for both Kantian philosophy and for our own inquiry. In 
searching for the difference between being and object we have traced the identity of being and object 
(i.e., object-oriented ontology) to the original transcendental differentiation that founds philosophy on 
the subject-object schema. We then found that Kant suggests the provenance of this schema in his 
identification of the unconditioned as the source of reason’s conflict with itself over the ultimate status 
of objects as things-in-themselves, and he indicates the character of the unconditioned as absolute but 
does not carry the idea through to its completion. As such, the ultimate status of being with regard to 
the subject-object schema is left to post-Kantian philosophy to decide. We will now attempt to think 
this absolute in a way that brings us out of the rule of subjects and objects and into a philosophical 
activity that corresponds to being more absolutely. That is, we will attempt a solution to the conflict of 
10
OSBORN
human nature represented in the dialectic of the unconditioned—but, to be clear, a solution that reduces
to neither transcendental idealism nor transcendent dogmatism. If Kant’s insight into the transcendental
constitution of the objects of knowledge was a revolution that put philosophy on a secure path, and if 
Harman’s ontology from the perspective of the self-constitution of the object is a counter-revolution, 
then the indeterminate path (unbedingt Gang) that we aim to chart is not that of another revolution—
not a mere reversal of either previous position—but, rather, a crossing over (Übergang) from the entire 
domain of the formation of objects to the transformation of both subjects and objects into their greater 
possibility of being.
IV. Thinking the Absolute with Novalis
The crossroads at which philosophy found itself in light of Kant’s transcendental critique is best 
captured in the first fragment of the first philosophical endeavor of Novalis. What is powerful about 
this fragment is that it not only serves as a summary of the key debates in the community of late 18th 
and early 19th century German philosophy, but it also transports the reader—of whatever time—into an 
immediate experience of what is at stake in those debates through the paradoxical character of what is 
said.
The fragment reads: Wir suchen überall das Unbedingte, und finden immer nur Dinge.35 This 
phrase is certainly one of the most difficult to translate in the whole of Western philosophical writing, 
but not due to a lack of conceptual clarity nor to any obscurity in the use of language on the part of the 
author. Rather, the difficulty results from the positive capacity of the phrase to bring us into an 
experience of the subject-object conflict and its provenance. In English, a standard translation is: “We 
seek the absolute everywhere and only ever find things.”36 This is a fine translation and serves its 
purpose to give the reader a sense of what is said. But, as a translation, it has inevitably made a 
decision for the reader by flattening the content of the saying, and thus some of the power to transport 
the reader into the decisive experience of the original problem sphere is lost. Thus, when we read of 
“the absolute” in English, our thought may seek immediate satisfaction in more familiar post-Kantian 
interpretations, like Fichte’s absolute subject or Hegel’s absolute spirit, passing over the provenance of 
all such discourse in das Unbedingte. Consequently, we miss the connection with Kant’s 
“unconditioned,” which we have said is the key to overcoming the challenge of object-oriented 
philosophy. But when read in German, the domain of the original problem that occupied post-Kantian 
philosophy opens up into its full dimensionality—and this not because of any special characteristic of 
the German language, but simply because the original saying of a thought still carries with it a 
background world of meaning that gives life to what is being said.
What we are faced with is an experience which is best described for us in our current context by
Gadamar, for whom the difficulty with translation and interpretation is the difficulty with dialogue. In 
the work of translating, the translator “cannot simply convert what is said out of the foreign language 
into his own without himself becoming again the one saying it.”37 Becoming the one saying it means 
that the translation goes beyond linguistic conversion and mental representation, that the translator not 
only must come to terms with what is said in an analysis of subject and predicate but must also step 
into the role of the sayer. He or she must experience the saying and not merely represent it. The work of
the translator is to “gain for himself the infinite space” of the saying in question. This space beyond 
representation that the translator must bring into play Gadamer calls a “third dimension from which the 
original (i.e., what is said in the original) is built up in its range of meaning.” To preserve this 
dimensionality, the task of the translator is “to place himself in the direction of what is said (i.e., in its 
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meaning) in order to carry over what is to be said into the direction of his own saying.”38 The image of 
the translator as eventful participant in the original saying and its subject matter, in contrast to the idea 
of a mere mental operation of copying and conversion, calls our attention to a third dimension of 
meaning available to the reader—a transformative experience beyond that of representational 
knowledge. Let us say that the translator must, for lack of a better word, embody the original saying, 
bringing the experience of what is said into its fullest dimensionality possible in a new saying for a new
reader. If what we have in mind when we talk about a philosophical text being “difficult” to read or 
translate is the ambiguity of its ideas or lack of clarity in its expression, then for Gadamer the difficulty 
is quite the opposite. Despite any genuine grammatical issues that a text may have, the principle 
difficulty has not to do with obscurity but with the overabundance of truth that shines through in the 
experience of the saying at stake. To participate in that truth as in a dialogue and to allow the infinite 
space of a saying to be experienced—finding and renewing the full dimensionality of meaning is the 
challenge of translation and of the interpretive work of philosophy.
It is in this sense that the fragment of Novalis is difficult to translate. As its readers, we are 
faced with the task of gaining the space in which what the fragment says can be experienced. But this 
difficult task is also what provides us with the positive potential in our current context, for the fragment
conveys the meaningful and decisive world-space of philosophy in the immediate aftermath of Kant’s 
Critique. In a single stroke, the fragment brings together the debates around freedom and necessity, self
and world, subjectivity and objectivity, appearance and reality, and being and thought that define the 
post-Kantian era. Yet in addition to transmitting information about a period in the history of philosophy,
the fragment presents us with an aporia with the power to transform the reader from observer into 
participant in the original problem that gave rise to its saying. Therefore, we want not merely to 
represent the saying to ourselves in the mental operation of a knowing subject grasping an object, but 
we want to experience the meaning of the fragment. That is, we are searching for what Novalis calls its 
“absolute meaning,” an interpretation that is both “means and end at the same time.” The fragment 
itself gives us insight into how it is to be read, i.e., not just the content but also the method of 
translation, for “every thing is itself the means whereby we can come to know it—to experience it or 
have an effect on it.” “In order to feel or come to know a thing completely,” Novalis contends, “I would
have to vivify it—make it into my own.”39 That knowledge entails appropriation is one of the central 
themes in Novalis’s thought, and leads him to a vision of philosophy as an essentially transformative 
(i.e., absolute) task. In this vision of philosophy lies Novalis’s criticism of Kant, Fichte, and the 
primacy of the subject-object schema. Therefore, in translating the first fragment of Novalis’s first 
philosophical project, and in accord with the view of philosophy and the absolute that Novalis himself 
elaborated, we are searching for an experience of that post-Kantian world which gives life to the 
fragment and in which the subject-object schema—that which we have said is determinative for the 
question of the difference between being and object—comes into being.
Wir suchen überall das Unbedingte, und finden immer nur Dinge. What immediately stands out 
in this sentence, even before its last syllable rolls off the tongue and well before we are able to make it 
an explicit object for translation, is the interplay between Unbedingte and Dinge. This interplay opens 
up the space in which we first come to inhabit the saying. It seems that everything is at stake in this 
space between the terms, and the question becomes, how do we translate Unbedingte and Dinge? What 
exactly is being sought, and what is being found? Further, what is the difference between these two 
objects of inquiry and how do we resolve their tension? Novalis has given us a restatement of the 
Kantian conflict of reason at the center of transcendental philosophy. We are reminded of the opening 
of the Critique—“Our reason has the peculiar fate that...”—and the fact that we are compelled to 
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search for the Unbedingte even though we only find Dinge is a problem to be solved through 
transcendental critique.
Thus, contrary to the English version we quoted initially, the most obvious translation for 
Novalis’s das Unbedingte within the Kantian context is “the unconditioned.” This decision about the 
unconditioned then sets us on a course toward Dinge, for the Un-bedingte is that thing which is itself 
not conditioned but serves as the original condition for conditioned things (Bedingten), and since the 
unconditioned is nowhere to be found—though we search for it—we can translate things in general 
(Dinge) as “conditioned things,” “objects of experience,” and “appearances.” We search everywhere for
the unconditioned, but we only ever find conditioned things. Beautiful in its succinct, epigrammatic 
form, yet nonetheless serious in its adherence to all the essential elements of Kantian critical 
philosophy, the fragment teaches us, in one quick blow, transcendental idealism. First, there is the 
foundational distinction between things in themselves and things as they appear to us, what we have 
called Kant’s doctrine of the binary object. Second, the fragment speaks to the fact that in experience 
we only find things as they are conditioned, not as they are in themselves or unconditioned. Third, we 
nevertheless search for something beyond this experience, and we are left with the unavoidable conflict
driven by the search for the unconditioned. Kant’s solution to this conflict is the doctrine of the binary 
object and the transcendental-transcendent distinction in the unconditioned, and Novalis’s fragment 
seems initially to support this solution. Human reason has two possible objects: those of empirical 
knowledge and those of transcendental ideas, those that we always find and those that we do not find 
but nevertheless search for. Whether we take the latter to be transcendent or transcendental does not 
matter, for whether the idea is posited in some object (even in the thing-in-itself) or in some subject 
(even in the transcendental subject) it is nonetheless a determinate thing. Thus, Novalis shows that 
whatever interpretation of the unconditioned one may have, the battle always comes out on the side of 
things. Novalis’s statement would seem to support, then, something like an object-oriented ontology. 
We simply drop the search for any non-thingly (un-be-dingte) thing, for it is clear from experience that 
what always and everywhere exists are thingly (be-dingte) things, whether transcendent with respect to 
us or not, or things in general (Dinge). It is true that these things have a dual sense—as knowable by us 
and as hidden from us—but this does not change the fact that they are objects nonetheless, for senses of
things are defined vis-a-vis the transcendental subject. Thus, Kantian transcendental philosophy and 
Harmanian object-oriented ontology converge in the predominance of things and the corresponding 
binary logic of the object. Both schools of thought, though supposedly diametrically opposed, could 
stake a claim to Novalis’s analysis of Kantian philosophy, because both stand on one side of the 
dialectical schema inherent in the Critique.
Yet, Novalis’s saying resists both claims, for the overwhelming persistence of the wir suchen to 
remain in play with the finden speaks against a one-sided solution in which nature itself is converted to 
Dinge as objects. So there must be another way to translate Novalis such that the Unbedingte is allowed
to be what it is, unconditioned and unthingly.
In our focus on the Unbedingte and Dinge we inevitably arrive at a solution in terms of objects, 
for what are these but the two possible objects of the wir suchen and finden? However, we remember 
that the Unbedingte itself is precisely that which resists being reduced to an object because it resists 
being securely grounded and determined in favor of this or that type of thing. If, then, we are to 
consider the subject matter according to the nature of that matter itself, the original problem must be 
transformed: instead of presenting us with a choice between two potential objects of knowledge, 
Novalis’s saying now becomes a statement of the nature and provenance of philosophical activity. 
Novalis is reinventing the Socratic paradox of inquiry, a version of which began this paper. The classic 
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form, given by Plato in Meno, says that one can never begin a search for something because “he cannot
search for what he knows—since he knows it, there is no need to search—nor for what he does not 
know, for he does not know what to look for.”40 Novalis’s fragment suggests a reformulation of the 
paradox once the focus is turned away from the objects of knowledge to the source of the subject-
object domain of knowledge. In our searching, he wants to say, we necessarily determine something as 
an object of inquiry, and thus the result of our search must always be a determined thing. In searching 
for the Unbedingte, however, we are searching for precisely that thing which is excluded from all 
determinate searching, which does not admit of being an object: the undetermined. So it would seem 
that we cannot search for the Unbedingte—and yet we are compelled to search for it.
Philosophy’s search for being as unbedingte runs aground in two ways, through two illusory 
acts: (1) the mimetic identification of Unbedingte with Dinge, in which the terms are brought together 
only after the Unbedingte has been represented as something separated from Dinge, i.e., as something 
conditional and non-absolute; (2) and the formal separation of the Unbedingte and Dinge, in which the 
absolute relation of the unconditioned to conditioned things is preserved in a dialectical concept but not
carried out in practice. First, we may presuppose that the undetermined is a determinate object and that 
we would find it among the determinate results of inquiry. In this case, we collapse the difference 
between the Unbedingte and Dinge and resolve all being on the side of determinate things, objects of 
knowledge. This is the error of the presupposition of knowledge of the thing-in-itself to which Kant 
applies his critical solution.41 But the critique can also be applied to Kant himself insofar as his solution
to the conflict is to locate the undetermined in a certain type of determinate being, namely, the 
transcendental subject. Thus, second, we may recognize the insufficiency of the Kantian critique to do 
justice to the Unbedingte, i.e., to think it with respect to its unthingly character, and be under no 
illusion that it could be reduced to this or that determinate object nor even to objectivity in general. In 
this case, though we try to hold the difference open, we nevertheless find that the results of our search 
always contradict the original object of our search, and we get nowhere. Despite our intentions, we are 
still expecting the Unbedingte as some object, when what we search for is no object at all but that 
which is unthingly and indeterminate. With the first error, we forge ahead along a path whose first step 
has, unbeknownst to us, always set us out in the wrong direction; with the second error, we give up too 
soon, our frustrated search bringing us to some version of skepticism. Both options, along with our 
inability to think our way out of Novalis’s paradox of inquiry, stem from a more original failure to act 
in accordance with the absolute nature of the unconditioned.
Socrates’ solution to the paradox of inquiry is to concede the intractability of the problem as 
given by Meno, within the logic of knower and known, and then to expand the meaning of inquiry to 
include a domain of existence in which knower and known are no longer in conflict. He demonstrates 
that a problem whose logic has forced us into inaction is best “solved” through a transformation of the 
terms of discussion and our concepts of world and self that condition them. Similarly, Novalis will 
concede the dialectical conflict between the knowable object and the unknowable object under the 
terms of Kant’s transcendental method, but he will insist that these terms are themselves conditioned 
and thus, according to the law of the unconditioned, refer to a prior sphere of determination. This 
sphere in which things are determined and come into being through the unconditioned Novalis will call 
the absolute, or being. By resolving the paradox through reference back to a transformative, rather than 
antagonistic, domain of existence, Socrates and Novalis show us that the determination of the subject 
matter of philosophy as meanings of things, or as the logic of the binary object, is not absolute and thus
not properly philosophical, for it presupposes a prior decision about being and nature in terms of 
subjects and objects. If what we search for is to be truly unconditioned, then the “object” of philosophy 
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can be no object at all but a mediative activity and absolute space of being prior to the original 
transcendental differentiation, and thus the carrying out of the Kantian idea of the absolutely 
unconditioned entails the overturning of the subject-object schema into the absolute dimensionality of 
un-be-dingte being. The development of the concept of the absolute in Novalis’s thinking is, then, 
nothing less than a demonstration of the difference between being thought absolutely (in its greatest 
possibility) and being thought as subject or object (in its least possibility).
So how does this help us translate Novalis’s fragment? Initially we quoted the passage in 
English, “we search everywhere for the absolute...,” and we said that this translation gets ahead of itself
by naming the Unbedingte the “absolute,” causing us to miss the original Kantian meaning. So we 
decided to step back and take a lesson on translation from Gadamer and then from Novalis. We found 
that the translator seeks the full dimensionality and absolute meaning of the saying, a search that enacts
a transformation of both the object of inquiry and the inquirer. Reading Novalis’s fragment again, we 
found that the interplay between Unbedingte and Dinge transported us into the meaning space of Kant’s
Critique and the transcendental method that puts philosophy on a secure path by separating subject 
from object and the unconditioned from conditioned things. However, this only brought us back to 
Kant’s conflict of reason, now understood as a crossroads at which the Unbedingte and Dinge of 
philosophical inquiry meet, and neither the operation of identification nor of division could get us past 
the impasse of these two terms. Following Socrates and Novalis, we had to let the paradox be 
transformed by the character of the Unbedingte as absolute. Have we now ended up where we started, 
having taken a long, circuitous path through Kant and Novalis toward that which was directly and 
plainly there before us with the initial English translation of the fragment? But our understanding of the
“absolute” is now different than it was at the beginning and is in fact intimately tied to the step back 
and subsequent traversal of meanings that was allowed to transform us and our method along the way. 
To be clear: we can no longer even think the Unbedingte at all apart from the transformation through 
which we have arrived at its absolute meaning. In other words, we cannot think it within the terms of 
the subject-object conflict. The Unbedingte, as absolute goal of philosophical inquiry, lies on both sides
of the divide between the unconditioned and conditioned things and between the search and its results, 
and thus it is not representable in terms of a transcendent object or a transcendental subject.
Novalis’s saying said exactly this all along, though we had to step back from a hasty translation 
and traverse the full dimensionality of its meaning. Where do we find the absolute? There it is, in the 
saying. Where in the saying? In the unconditioned, of course. But we do not find the unconditioned 
anywhere, since we only ever find conditioned things. The unconditioned is in the wir suchen, or, as 
Kant says, in the task of searching for it. And so the absolute is not found in the saying as a free-
floating concept to be grasped by representation between subjects, nor as the object of a verb. It is 
found in the saying of the saying, insofar as the saying of a saying must, following Novalis and 
Gadamer, accord with the nature of that which is said. Thus, if in philosophy our object is the absolute 
Unbedingte, it is found in the absolute operation of the saying of what needs to be said. If we were to 
freeze the operation at any moment, the Unbedingte would break apart into the “unconditioned” and 
“things,” subjects and objects, producing the illusion of a non-absolute result, of two Dinge that must 
be brought together or divided according to some schema. Such a suspended philosophical moment 
makes a knowledge of objects possible and indeed is the source of the paradox of knowledge, but it 
does not do justice to the absolutely unconditioned, which is not one side but the whole, not subjects or 
objects but their provenance. Thus, Novalis’s fragment does not present a choice between one side or 
the other but demonstrates the absolute nature of the subject matter of philosophy in the irreducible 
interplay of philosophical activity. The absolute is there in the interplay between the “unconditioned” 
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and “things.” It is itself not a thing, not an appearance nor even a thing in itself, not an object of 
knowledge but the search, not a first principle on which to found a philosophy but the nature of human 
activity insofar as we seek nature itself. The absolute is the demand of the unconditioned to not rest in 
the intractable conflict between knower and known nor in the domain of nature determined as subject 
and object, but to go all the way to the widest expanse of existence, being.
Therefore, if the Unbedingte is what we search for in philosophical inquiry, then the “object” of 
philosophy is not some object of knowledge; rather, it must be the transformation that happens between
the searcher (subject) and the searched for (object), and between the unconditioned (the goal) and 
conditioned things (the results) in the interplay of the search. The result of this interplay, being neither a
subject nor an object but “the absolute center of these divided worlds,” their “absolute copula,” is, says 
Novalis, “consciousness of the laws of existence” (or being), and “through the discovery of this 
consciousness the great puzzle is largely solved.” That is, instead of a decision always between types of
objects, what is at stake in the search for the unconditioned is a transformation of the “object” of 
knowledge in accord with the nature of the very activity of philosophical inquiry, i.e., a transition from 
the unconditioned as some object, whether in itself or conditioned, as in transcendental philosophy and 
object-oriented ontology, to the absolute meaning of the unconditioned according to the full 
dimensionality of existence in general. The search for the Unbedingte entails, or in fact is, the 
philosophical transformation of human existence, or, life according to philosophy and philosophy 
according to life.42 It is for this reason that, in his critique of Fichte, Novalis says that the absolute 
nature of the unconditioned means that it cannot be obtained positively as an object or first principle of 
knowledge but only negatively through the search for it.43 Like food is to life, he will say later, a 
philosophical problem is properly solved “when it is destroyed as such,” for the goal of philosophy is 
not a solution but an “absolute operation”: the activity aroused by the search itself.44 Accordingly, the 
paradox of inquiry is “solved” through the transformation of the aim of philosophy from some object of
possible knowledge to the Unbedingte as such, now understood as the pre-transcendental 
“consciousness” of the transformative nature of existence in general, or being. The conflict of reason 
with itself—what we have called, following Kant, the peculiar fate of human nature—is “solved” 
through the consciousness of transformative action as the goal of our inquiry, and according to the 
absolute nature of the Unbedingte the proper object of philosophy is neither a subject (not even the 
transcendental subject) nor an object (not even the thing in-itself), but the overturning of the subject-
object schema into the indeterminacy of the existence out of which it first comes into being.
Only now can we properly translate Novalis’s saying as: We seek everywhere the absolute and 
only ever find things. The und is not a “but,” and the fragment does not say, “we search everywhere for 
the absolute, but, unfortunately, we only find things.” The fragment is a positive statement of an 
existential fact. Certainly there is a difference between the Unbedingte and Dinge, and this is indeed the
difference between being and object that our inquiry seeks. But while the nur makes it clear that the 
Unbedingte cannot be a thing among things but the un-thingly, the conjunction und resists any attempt 
to treat the difference as an opposition between two terms. Therefore, we must conclude that the 
difference does not consist in a separation but in an absolute, constant conjunction, a pre-
transcendental relation that precedes and thus determines the search for the unconditioned. The 
fragment thus points us to the “laws of existence,” or being, from and through which things as such 
come to be. Because in philosophical inquiry we find proof of that which is neither a subject nor an 
object but their provenance, to think being absolutely necessarily brings about what Kant could not 




V. Being and Mere Being
In our search for the difference between being and object, we followed the trail of Kant’s claim that the 
Unbedingte, as both source and goal of philosophical activity, must be unconditioned and absolute. We 
found that the interpretation of the unconditioned offered by transcendental philosophy was insufficient
because, whether looked at from the transcendental or transcendent side, it remained a thing, a term 
within the subject-object determination of nature. Yet Kant did offer a clue to the indeterminate nature 
of being by insisting that the unconditioned must be absolute, in the greatest possible sense. Novalis 
picked up on this clue and made the absolute the key to resolving the tension within reason and 
between self and world and subject and object that was inherent in Kant’s Critique. For Novalis, the 
trail of the unconditioned in transcendental philosophy leads him to think the absolute “object” of 
philosophy as existence in general, or being, out of which the concepts of subject and object are later 
derived. Consequently, our inquiry has found a way through the idle worldview of dialectical objects 
and found reason to keep on the search for being insofar as it is not object.
However, our mere arrival at a concept of being does not secure the goal of our inquiry, for 
there is still a danger that “being” would be determined as itself an object, in our case the result at the 
end of a process or the form of a relation between concepts, and thus the distinction between being and 
object would still be consumed by the very transcendental system that it was supposed to overcome. 
Our problem here—which, the reader will notice, is a reiteration of the dispute with the object-oriented 
worldview that launched this inquiry—is similar to that experienced by Novalis, who, in light of the 
tendency of Fichte’s “absolute I” to revert into itself, was challenged to give an account of being 
beyond the all-consuming rhetorical force of the two dimensions of a transcendental system. A brief 
look at this account will serve to clarify what we do and do not mean by “being” and to demonstrate the
task of this paper to present the difference of being beyond the object-oriented worldview and the 
subject-object schema.
The key to understanding being as absolute and the relation of both to a transformation of 
Kantian transcendental philosophy is to think the distinction between formal or mere being and being 
(as such), or to put it differently, between “being” and being. This, according to Dalia Nassar, is the 
distinction that Novalis makes. Nassar argues that in his critical appropriation of Fichte, Novalis finds 
it necessary to distinguish between two senses of being, and that this distinction is determinative for the
idea of the absolute for which he is known and through which he attempts to go beyond the 
transcendental systems of Kant and Fichte. The crucial distinction is between being (Seyn) and what 
Novalis calls “mere being” (Nur Seyn). “Mere being” is a concept of being to which nothing real 
adheres, no distinction or content. It is being beyond all consciousness and presentation, a “pro forma” 
copula expressing logical identity. It expresses “a handful of darkness.” But being, as the aim and 
concern of philosophy, must include difference and determination, for philosophy always begins with 
some original determination of being through which being is presented, expressed, or differentiated.45 
Though “mere being” would appear to be the most basic expression of ultimate reality, that which 
could serve as the first principle of an ontology, says Nassar of Novalis’s view, “in fact it is not real—it
has no ontological reality. Mere being is not being—it is not what is in the world, it is not that which 
constitutes and underlies reality. There is no mere being, or, ‘nothing in the world is merely’.”46 Against
this concept of “mere being,” Novalis will insist that because existence in general cannot reduce to its 
formal “in-itself” principle, being as the concern of philosophy cannot be such a formal principle. Thus,
as Nassar explains, being for Novalis is not “mere,” “not something that is beyond all differentiation 
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and determination.” If it is to be absolute and not merely “mere,” being must not be opposed to 
determinate things, nor outside any relation to beings and consciousness, but rather it must be the 
“absolute relation.”47
Novalis uses the image of mediation or oscillation (das Schweben) to describe the nature of 
being as reality instead of as mere object:
All being, being in general, is nothing but free-being—oscillation between extremes, which are 
necessarily to be united and separated. Out of this light-point of oscillation streams all reality—
in it everything is contained—object and subject come into being through it, not it through 
them.48
In this way, Novalis is proposing an “object” for philosophy quite distinct from the binary object of 
Kant and Harman: being, neither an aspect of the transcendental subject nor a thing-in-itself beyond the
subject, but the domain of an absolute relation between subject and object, their provenance and 
determination. As such, it is not a different type of thing over and against objects and subjects, but it is 
the overturning of the subject-object schema into the sphere of their mediation and source, the full 
(absolute) dimensionality of existence. The consequences of this conception of being for philosophy 
are clear: philosophy can no longer be conceived as striving after the unconditioned as first principle or
secure foundation, for insofar as its concern is being, and insofar as being is thought absolutely, the aim
of philosophy is a “groundless ground.” The goal of philosophy is “to grasp being as reality... the goal 
of philosophy is life.” Thus, this difference between being and mere being leads Novalis to “a different 
way of doing philosophy.”49
That his account of being as absolute leads Novalis to a different idea of philosophical practice 
accords with the guiding thesis of our inquiry. First, the search for the difference between being and 
object, as for the difference between being and mere being, necessitates a transformation of the 
philosopher and the way of doing philosophy. Consequently, what is at stake in these distinct “objects” 
of philosophy are more than topics of discourse; rather, they involve differing purposes for the 
philosopher, plans for philosophy, and schematizations of existence in general. Second, Novalis’s 
critique of mere being and his thesis of an absolute sphere of nature in which the Kantian conflicts of 
reason are resolved suggest a solution to the challenge of the identity of being and object that we face. 
The absolute refers us beyond the epistemological conflict of objects and subjects and points to the 
domain in which such transcendental differentiations come into being. Philosophical activity, insofar as
it searches for the absolute Unbedingte, becomes the solution to all versions of the paradox of inquiry 
because its goal is decidedly not some object but being in general, by which we mean being not as a 
form or logical operation but in its full dimensionality. Through the philosophical labor of our inquiry, 
we demonstrate that dimensionality of being which cannot reduce to the dialectical discourse of 
objects, and in this way we put object-oriented ontology to rest. Finally, then, the difference between 
being and object is the difference between the absolute and either side of transcendental experience (the
object “in itself” and the object “for us”). Since in aiming to overturn the reduction of being to object 
we are necessarily displacing the philosopher as subject, this difference puts to us a choice about 
philosophical practice: on the one hand, in our inquiry, the “object” of philosophy is being and thus 
transformative, while on the other, in a science of being determined as object, it is mere being and thus 
the object “in itself” to which the philosopher, as subject, is contradictorily indifferent. Our search for 
the difference between being and object has led us past their identity to the absolute Unbedingte and the
choice that defines philosophy.
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VI. Philosophy and Object-Oriented Ontology
Through a “speculative metaphysics” that takes being as mere being and treats all things, irrespective 
of their nature, as objects against a subject, object-oriented ontology is supposed to provide an 
alternative to the Kantian revolution which prioritizes human beings over things-in-themselves.50 
Moreover, Harman claims that a turn to objects also solves the problem of the “philosophy of access,” a
contemporary restatement of the paradox that, since Kant’s transcendental turn, has trapped philosophy 
in a self-reflexive circle of thought. The basic version of the “philosophy of access” says that “we 
cannot think something without thinking it,” and that all questions about reality refer back to the human
subject and its foundational relation to world, and thus the problem is the same as that which Quentin 
Meillassoux calls “correlationism.”51 But notice that for these thinkers of “speculative realism” the 
problem is not that there is a gap between us and the world or between subject and object, but that the 
“subjective” term in the relation is given priority in all philosophical questions. So even if he has 
brought our attention to a pernicious one-sidedness of Kantianism that constrains philosophy, Harman’s
solution demonstrates a deep misunderstanding of what is problematic in the paradox, for because its 
central principle is “to put object-object relations on exactly the same footing as subject-object 
relations” and thus “reverse Kant’s Copernican Revolution,”52 object-oriented ontology proposes to 
merely shift our focus to the “objective” side within the same dialectical schema that originally creates
the problem. Harman says that the solution to the problem of “access” is to separate what we know and 
what we don’t know about the object of thought, giving us “tool-being” and the Kantian doctrine of 
binary objects. Socrates’ solution to the same problem, in contrast, is to dissolve the power of the 
dialectic between knower and known by referring us back, not to one of the terms in the relation, but to 
a more absolute domain of being, beyond human being as we know it.53 Harman’s solution requires an 
indifferent philosopher that labors endlessly over the transcendental differentiation and the dual 
meaning of “object” before being able to begin any search, while Socrates says that it is precisely such 
a “debater’s argument” that produces an idle philosopher and a frustrated search. The point for Socrates
is that a consciousness of our pre-epistemological familiarity with being and thus of our transformative 
relation to the “object” of philosophy makes us “energetic and keen on the search” and, for that, better 
philosophers.54 Therefore, he is right to say that “the solution offered by Socrates remains the true 
solution,”55 but, because the object of his philosophy is mere being, or object, Harman remains within 
the transcendental-transcendent dialectic of the epistemological conflict as given by Kant, and he 
completely misunderstands the nature of that solution.
We have found that the true solution to the paradox of inquiry as well as the only alternative to 
Kantian transcendental philosophy is to be found in the carrying out of the absolute meaning of Kant’s 
Unbedingte, which leads us in each case to that with which we are most familiar, being, not to objects. 
Now the object-oriented ontologist would likely protest our solution as follows: but if we turn away 
from objects, are we not abandoning the possibility of the existence of entities independent of the 
philosopher? By denying priority to the very concept (“object”) through which we divide the world into
transcendent and transcendental realms, so the argument goes, we are left with no resources for talking 
about things themselves apart from the philosopher’s pretensions, and our philosophy can never rise 
above self-interested half-truths. In other words, are we aligning ourselves with the humanisms, 
pragmatisms, and anti-realisms at which the critical force of Harman’s speculative metaphysics is 
aimed?56 And we would answer: on the contrary, in making being the goal of our philosophy we are 
stepping back from the transcendental differentiation of nature into subject and object which abandons 
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beings to the schemes of the transcendental philosopher. If this turn brings us away from objects, it is 
because it orients us toward beings as they themselves are and the way in which nature itself is, beyond
the machinations of both objects and subjects. This is not the self-referential activity of the absolute I of
idealism, for we are concerned more than object-oriented ontology with the object of our search and the
transformative thesis it entails. Of this thesis we can say what Nassar says of Novalis’s account of 
nature, that “this transformation, however, does not imply—as it does in Kant—a subjectification of 
knowledge. Rather, it aims to disclose the principles that underlie and inhere in nature itself.”57 Said 
differently, and anticipating a second objection from Harman, the transformational turn which our 
inquiry calls for is not the pragmatic conversion of beings from Ereignis to Vorgang of which Harman, 
perhaps rightly, accuses Dreyfus;58 but nor is it a turn away from Dasein to Harman’s province of 
indifference. Instead, the turn to the difference between being and object is the exact movement that 
Harman pretends but fails to practice, insofar as the goal of his ontology is a formal mechanism of 
objects (Vorgang) rather than the transformative event of being (Ereignis). Thus, if it is true, as Harman
says, that the full meaning of being only appears when “we take our bearings” from the nature of things
themselves,59 then it follows that in turning to being as Ereignis we are not “subjects” searching for an 
“object”—terms that have power only where the transcendental differentiation is the foundation of a 
discursive edifice—but beings of being. It is of this meaning of “the turn” that Heidegger speaks in 
what is the clearest statement of the consistent subject matter of his thought:
The true turn, namely, that which belongs to Ereignis:
the transition from the schematization of being into the provenance of schematization
as harbinger of the transformative event of being.60
Both our transformative thesis and die Kehre als Ereignis are concerned with that which is absolute in 
being, rather than with mere being or being as law. Kant and Harman each discover such a law, but 
they cannot carry out their respective discoveries insofar as each adheres to a one-sided stance within 
the subject-object schematization of being.
Therefore, on the one hand, our thesis follows Harman in rejecting “deflationary realism” and 
both the strong and weak “philosophy of access”—the assertion that nothing exists outside the knowing
subject and the weaker claim that any attempt to think something outside the knowing subject turns it 
into an object and nihilates it—as well as the dialectical dilemma they produce.61 Both assertions 
presuppose a one-sided determination of being that renders being itself meaningless. On the other hand,
parting ways with Harman, and following Kant’s insight that a dialectical conflict is resolved not 
through one side but through the unconditioned of the terms, we further find the determination of being
as mere being (object-oriented ontology) just as meaningless and impossible as the paradox of inquiry. 
Harman’s object, product of his conversion of der Sinn von Sein into “tool-being,” falls into the same 
dialectical scheming about being as does the reduction of being to thought by the “philosophy of 
access.” So whereas Harman’s alternative to Kant is a counter-revolution, a turn to those transcendent 
objects of the transcendental domain (the supposedly neglected things-in-themselves), our search for 
the difference of being leads to a transformation: being is not object just as we are not subjects. Thus, 
our guiding thesis since the introduction has been that the search for the difference between being and 
object entails an experience beyond the subject-object domain. This is a possibility that Kant himself 
did not consider but which results from the application of the task of the Unbedingte to the shared 
presupposition of both object-oriented ontology and transcendental philosophy: that dialectical domain 




We saw that through a search for the absolute meaning of the unconditioned in Novalis’s saying,
the difference between being and object took on a new light. The difference is no longer 
transcendental, an idea that regulates the transcendental subject and its objects, nor transcendent, an 
elusive thing in itself cut off from the subject, but the difference is now thought as the third dimension 
through which the terms in the dialectical conflict can come into being at all. So to the possibilities for 
resolving the conflict of reason and the peculiar fate of human nature as given by Kant—the 
transcendental and transcendent interpretations of the Unbedingte—we now add a third, which we have
called the transformative. It is necessary to add this third category because, as we noted in our 
discussion of Kant, the transcendent can be reduced to the transcendental, even though we would 
intend it as really transcendent, i.e., absolute. This reduction is the self-assigned fate of object-oriented 
ontology, for it attempts to go beyond Kant’s transcendental philosophy precisely through a reversal of 
the dialectic between subject and object. As happens in such reversals, Harman’s orientation toward 
objects intends to do justice to the supposedly neglected side (things-in-themselves), while what it 
achieves is a deeper entrenchment in the original transcendental differentiation which reduces nature to 
subjects and objects for the purpose of charting a secure course for a logic of being as object. Because 
he wants to overcome the ontological correlation between being and human being, and because he sees 
no third option that would resolve the conflict of human reason within being itself, Harman rejects a 
relational sense of being (being as absolute) for a substantial-formal sense (being as object).62 This 
ensures that every sentence of Tool-Being, despite its contributions toward overcoming certain 
subjectivist tendencies in Heidegger scholarship, is locked in the very type of metaphysical dual that 
the Seinsfrage was from the start aimed at displacing—and, therefore, Harman misunderstands the key 
to Sein selbst in Heidegger’s thought: ontological difference.63 Indeed, our discovery of a third sense of 
Kant’s unconditioned, implying as it does a third dimension of being, entails a dimension of ontological
difference beyond Harman’s two-axis concept. Beyond the mechanical dualisms of “tool-being” and 
the difference between nothing and something at all (non-being and mere being) of object-oriented 
ontology, we have found in Kant’s distinction between “the least of an object” and “the greatest 
possibility of a thing” a difference between mere being and absolute being. This final “ontological 
difference” is nothing other than the difference between being and object.
Failing to consider this third dimension beyond the transcendental-transcendent distinction, 
beyond subjects and objects, and beyond the meaning of being as mere being, object-oriented ontology 
neglects the possibility of a transformative relation between the philosopher and the object of 
philosophy, and offers a vision of philosophy which is no philosophy at all, for the proper response to 
Harman’s object is not love but indifference. The love of the absolute object of philosophy, being, can 
only exist in a practice that allows itself to be transformed by the absolute nature of that object. Without
a relation to its object, there is no possibility of transformation, and without the possibility of 
transformation there is no love and thus no philosophy. From the perspective of the object of object-
oriented ontology, the existence of the philosopher makes no difference at all. Though this proposition 
of the “realism” (thing-in-itself-ness) of objects may be true, it can be of only juridical interest, 
because it is a statement about mere being that requires only formal acknowledgement and nothing 
more. What the proposition of indifference proposes is that there is no practice, no philosophical 
activity, consequent to the concept of its object of philosophy. Aiming toward such an object that never 
reaches a practice is, to paraphrase Kant, the same as missing the point of philosophy altogether, and 
thus the concept deserves the charge that it is a mere idea (ist nur eine Idee).64 To posit the indifference 
of objects as the central doctrine of an ontology implies the abandonment of philosophy, since it 
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implies that the philosopher could just as well exist as not exist, could just as well hate as love, tear 
down as build up, do injustice as do justice, remain idle as be keen on the search for the unconditioned.
In contrast, the absolute object of philosophy entails the difference, and the point of philosophy 
is not an object per se but a transformation of ourselves and the world as we know them. Thus, the 
difference between being and object as goal of philosophy is a practical idea, by which we do not mean
that it is “useful” in the ordinary sense, that it is advantageous like a technique or of economic value 
like a commodity. It is not first subjectively practical like a tool nor objectively like the bit of 
information technology, but it is truly fruitful. The difference has the peculiar character of “actually 
bringing about what is contained in its concept.”65 So while it is true, as Kant says of the transcendental
idea, that no object is adequate to the concept of being (insofar as it is not an object), to grasp its 
conceptual formation is to have already gone beyond the limits of transcendental experience, which in 
turn is a demonstration, within a concrete experience, of the existence of the difference in nature. In 
that sense the difference is an absolute idea, bringing together aspects of transcendental and practical 
ideas of Kant. So while the object is defined by its indifference to all human practice, being is 
essentially related to a practice. The goal of our inquiry is a philosophical practice—not a theory about 
nor an internal mechanism of an object, but a love between sophia and phronesis, a mutual 
transformation of philosopher and “object” of philosophy in the search for the Unbedingte.
In this way, the claim that began this inquiry—that the presentation of the difference between 
being and object entails a transformative thesis—bears fruit. As a task for philosophy, the difference is 
that idea of which Novalis says that it “cannot be grasped in a proposition” but only in a “living 
demonstration,” cannot be described at all but only “represented in a practice,” and therefore “the idea 
must contain the complete law of its own dissolution.”66 The difference prescribes the law that being is 
not object. But being, insofar as it is not object, cannot be comprehended as a law nor described in 
terms of subjects and objects. The law of being prescribes the dissolution of being as law. Thus being 
as the “object” of philosophy is found only in the practice which entails the difference—the carrying 
out of being entails the overturning of mere being. Therefore, if the law of being, or being as object, is 
called ontology, what then do we call the carrying out of being, or the overturning of philosophy as 
ontology? We have called it the difference between being and object, but Novalis often calls it love: the
absolute love of an absolute object, it is the idea of philosophy.67 In this transformative practice of the 
law of being—in the Unbedingte of all Dinge, where subjects and objects, the antimony of human 
reason, and the paradox of inquiry are resolved—exists the “object” of philosophy.
VII. Conclusion: The “Object” of Philosophy
We began this paper with a thought experiment that threatened to thwart our search for the difference 
between being and object. We decided to forge ahead anyway with the hope that the search would 
reveal a solution to the conflict. What has the search revealed? What can we now say about the “object”
of our inquiry? We have found that we can no longer even think the difference between being and 
object apart from our search for it and the traversal of the world of things and meanings that brought 
us to our current station. This is not a claim about an object, whether “in itself” or “for us,” nor about 
the properties, capacities, and limits of subjects. It is a statement about the nature of philosophical 
activity and the decision about being that it portends. If philosophy always seeks the Unbedingte, then 
the “object” of philosophical inquiry must become the means by which one searches for it. But if the 
“object” of philosophy is the difference between being and object, then it can only be sought in the 
domain of the coming into being of the differentiation of subject and object. To thus seek the 
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provenance of the subject-object schema, philosophy is compelled to traverse the absolute 
dimensionality of being. To begin such a search, one must release the conflict of reason and the 
paradox of duplicitous objects, and allow one and one’s search to be transformed by the Unbedingte of 
all being. Philosophy, insofar as its “object” is being, is this activity of absolute transformation.
The difference between being and object contains a difference in the nature and concern of 
philosophy. In the first introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre of 1797, Fichte declares a plan for 
philosophy in the wake of Kant. He defines philosophy as the task of explaining experience through 
abstracting from experience to its ground, and he distinguishes two possible starting points resulting 
from this original philosophical act, namely, the “thing in itself” and the “intellect in itself.”68 The 
“object of philosophy” is thus not experience but its “explanatory ground,” which must be one of two 
opposing terms that the philosopher brings into existence with the founding act of abstraction. There is 
no other possibility, he says, if we are to proceed “consistently” according to the concept of philosophy 
as the turn from experience to an “in itself” principle, and the Wissenschaftslehre issues a challenge to 
the post-Kantian world to find any different foundation and goal for philosophy, whether in experience 
or by abstracting from it, that does not reduce to one of the two given principles, thing and intellect. 
Anyone who would dispute the claim that idealism and dogmatism are the only possible systems for 
philosophy “must prove that consciousness of experience contains some additional component beyond 
the two already mentioned.”69 For the reader that has discovered Kant’s Unbedingte, thought the 
absolute with Novalis, and experienced the transformative meaning of the difference between being 
and object, let the preceding investigation stand as such a proof.
As they distill transcendental critique into its most primitive decision, Fichte’s two paths are just
the two possible worldviews (subject-oriented and object-oriented philosophy) offered by the original 
transcendental differentiation, and Fichte unwittingly makes explicit what we have identified as the 
founding act of the Kantian revolution: the determination of being that sets philosophy on a secure 
course by guaranteeing its results in terms of certain principles of reason, namely, subjects and objects. 
However, neither Kant nor Fichte can see this their own original transcendental plan, for reasons that 
the Wissenschaftslehre makes clear. Because reason is “absolutely self-sufficient” and nothing exists 
outside of reason, insofar as it is the ground of philosophy, then the type of being that corresponds to 
this absolute “in itself” principle must be everywhere presupposed and cannot be called into question.70 
That unassailable and foundational being at stake in philosophy as “science of knowledge” is the 
rational subject. Consequently, the search for the unconditioned in transcendental idealism, despite the 
apparent dialectical conflict between transcendental and transcendent meanings, never gets past the 
subjectivity of the subject, and much less does it question the differentiation of being into subjects and 
objects at all. The “object of philosophy” is, then, the “laws of the intellect” or the “self-reverting 
acting” of the “I,” the only principle that can satisfy the search for the unconditioned of experience 
given the bounds prescribed by that same “original act of the subject.”71
Yet in a second, strikingly distinct description of philosophy, reminding us more of Socrates’ 
response to Meno than of a transcendental system, Fichte says that every philosophy is a “standpoint,” 
and every “standpoint” chooses a “first principle,” and every “first principle” entails a decision about 
the nature and ultimate concern of the human species. Then he declares that “the philosophy one 
chooses thus depends upon the kind of person one is. For a philosophical system is not a lifeless 
household item one can put aside or pick up as one wishes; instead, it is animated by the very soul of 
the person who adopts it.”72 Here Fichte goes beyond the language of “thing” and “intellect” and thus 
says more than he knows. For although Fichte’s philosopher is a Vernunftwesen whose ultimate concern
is to affirm itself in argumentation, and his first principle is thus der Satz des Grundes and the “laws of 
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the intellect,” all leading to the philosophical standpoint of idealism73—he also brings our attention to 
the contingency of this ground of philosophy. While, on the one hand, philosophy is animated by the 
very being of the philosopher—what being?—on the other hand, the philosopher is animated by the 
search for the unconditioned, which is in turn animated by the absolute “object” of philosophy. Now 
we glimpse philosophy conditioned by something outside of both the transcendental subject and the act
of abstraction that supposedly founds philosophy and grounds experience—i.e., we understand this 
ideal act to also be a “standpoint” to which there corresponds a decision about being and thus a more 
absolute ground.
Fichte’s objection would be that having moved outside the realm of the transcendental choice 
and the law of reason, we have rejected the essence of the human as philosopher and abandoned 
philosophy itself. But such a response only goes to show the extent to which Fichte takes for granted 
precisely that which in philosophy must be demonstrated in practice: the absolute ground of existence. 
At the moment when the Wissenschaftslehre (and by implication the Kritik) is supposed to reach its 
clearest exposition and most irrefutable ground, the truly foundational act of all “science of 
knowledge” is hiding in plain sight: if the presupposition of transcendental idealism is that “all 
consciousness,” by which is meant being as knowledge, “is based upon and conditioned by self-
consciousness,” by which is meant absolute subjectivity, then it is our discovery that this is only 
possible through the proto-philosophical act in which being is divided into a dialectical conflict 
between “the thinking subject” and “the object of thought.”74 In other words, the Wissenschaftslehre 
raises the question—surreptitiously, and precisely to the extent that Fichte himself does not raise it but 
presumes it to be definitively solved in the standpoint of the human species as Vernunftwesen—as to 
whether the goal of philosophy is not a mere principle of reason but, as Novalis claims, an “absolute 
postulate” or “a connection with the whole,” out of which comes “all reality” and through which 
subject and object, intellect and thing, can first be posited at all.75 Just as Fichte is permitted—
according to “the supreme law of reason,” which is only the subjective side of the Kantian 
philosophical task to seek the absolutely unconditioned—to pose the question of the ground of 
experience (or “being for us”), so we are compelled, according to that same Kantian task, to widen our 
scope for the “object of philosophy” beyond both “being for us” and being as object.76 By posing the 
question of the difference between being and object, and having identified the original transcendental 
differentiation of nature into subject and object that conditions Kantian philosophy, we have 
demonstrated the existence of a principle that grounds existence beyond Fichte’s two paths and the 
transcendental-transcendent dialectic and, therefore, carried out a philosophical practice in the spirit of 
the absolute meaning of the Unbedingte. Philosophy no longer begins with abstraction to subjects and 
objects, but rather it begins with a truly absolute principle, namely, being insofar as it is not object—a 
principle which does not first come into being through philosophical argumentation but is realized in 
our traversal of the transformative synchrony between subject and object, philosopher and “object of 
philosophy.”
Therefore, we can affirm with Fichte that the philosophy one chooses depends on “the kind of 
person one is,” but it is equally true that the kind of person one is depends on the Unbedingte of their 
philosophy. The “object” of philosophical inquiry depends on the origin and manner of the search; 
likewise, the search is animated by the “object.” This incontrovertible dual of truths, this antimony, 
only appears to destine philosophy to an irresolvable conflict, for the illusion of a strange fate of reason
pressing down upon us, forcing us into idle conflict, is dispelled through the absolute meaning of the 
unconditioned, and the challenge to philosophy of the object-oriented worldview, like Meno’s 
challenge to Socrates, immediately dissolves in the practice of the law of being. Thus we apply Kant’s 
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“critical decision” in The Antimony of Pure Reason back onto the foundation of the Critique itself, 
onto Fichte’s one-sided absolute, and onto that “transcendental illusion” in the shadow of which object-
oriented philosophy quarrels with Kant: the subject-object antimony of being. “For when we allow the 
arguments of reason to oppose one another with perfect freedom, something valuable and useful for the
correction of our judgments will always result, though it may not always be what we were searching 
for.”77 When we direct the Kantian plan at its own original transcendental antimony, something 
unexpected happens: the result is not a regulative principle, transcendental idea, maxim of reason nor 
any other power or principle of the subject, but an entirely different interest and mode of thought 
appears, namely, a domain of inquiry whose “object” defies the division of nature into subjects and 
objects. But like sketching a three-dimensional terrain onto a two-dimensional plane, we come to an 
awareness of this domain through the swing back and forth across the forms of schematization of 
being, which is to say, through the trans-formational activity of philosophy. The conflicting 
determinations of being point to the Unbedingte of all philosophical practice: the absolute copula of 
beings beyond the philosopher’s distinctions. Accordingly, in our inquiry into the difference we realize 
a transformative law: being is not object just as we are not subjects. In this the goal of philosophy, 
nature itself prevails in both thought and deed, and beings themselves—and not just the “rational 
creature”—fulfill the absolute law (i.e., the difference) of being.
We can recapitulate the course of our investigation with a renewed clarification of the difference
between our thesis and the claim that founds transcendental philosophy. Ours is not the claim that the 
“object” of philosophy must refer back to an aspect of the human subject and its activity, but nor is our 
“object” some “thing” over and against the philosopher and philosophy, for the difference between 
being and object is neither transcendental nor transcendent—it cannot be consumed by either side of 
the subject-object antinomy. We are not concerned with whether and the extent to which we can know 
things merely “in themselves.” That question and its results we happily surrender to rigorous Kantians 
like Harman who, having stopped at the letter of the law, would “bring down what is high instead of 
raising up what is low” and thus convert beings into Formularwesen.78 Kant set for philosophy a secure
course according to the original transcendental differentiation of nature, and Harman, despite his 
counter-revolution, does not veer from that plan but only fills out the schematic even further. But even 
within the plan, in the heart of the Critique, Kant also suggests a higher possibility of being and left to 
philosophy the idea of a more absolute task. Novalis identified this task as the activity of philosophy 
par excellence and proposed a transformative sphere in which the search for the unconditioned and the 
things themselves coexist, consequently freeing the absolute from both the absolute subjectivity of 
Fichte and, as if anticipating object-oriented ontology, the reduction of being to mere being. Novalis 
thus answers the challenge of the Wissenschaftslehre by removing its basic presupposition: instead of 
searching for laws that explain consciousness, philosophy seeks a transformative consciousness of the 
laws of existence. But it is not enough that we know such laws, since, as being itself, they implicate 
ourselves and everything that could be construed as subjects and objects in their full dimensionality. 
Thus, the task of this paper, that of the philosopher’s Unbedingte, compels us beyond the letter of the 
law of being to its spirit, for the law of the difference is not grasped except through the anima that 
achieves the difference. The result of this task is not merely discursive, not a knowledge of ourselves as
subjects or beings as objects, but an experience of the absolute dimension of being which is consequent
to the idea of the difference between being and object. Both our “object” and we ourselves have been 
transformed in the course of the inquiry, and we can no longer imagine a genuinely philosophical 
practice that disavows this transformative dimension in order to remain in the idle domain of 
dialectical objects and their province of indifference.
25
BEING AND OBJECT
Just as the paradox of inquiry in its various forms results from a failure to act in accordance 
with the nature of philosophy’s “object,” so the turn to objects and objectivity in the information-
technological age, far from achieving an alternative to the primacy of subjectivity, is a direct result of 
the failure to envision the philosopher, and the human being, as anything other than a subject. The great
irony of object-oriented thinking, as well as of new “realisms,” is that in their struggle against Kant the 
results of the Kritik are shifted onto beings as objects, the original transcendental differentiation of 
nature is further covered over and entrenched, and the image of the human as Vernunftwesen is thus 
reproduced in a more insidious form. And this happens not because we are destined to the cruel fate of 
“correlationism,” not because the philosopher is unable to think beings outside the circle of the 
subject’s thought, but because one does not escape a circular path by reversing directions.
If the subjectification of being in the wake of Kant’s transcendental revolution produced a 
universal philosophical disregard for the things themselves apart from the human subject, what would 
its reversal produce? What does an object-oriented ontology always “pass up” in its sweeping 
transcendental gesture toward being as object? Beings insofar as they are not objects. Having presented
our inquiry and participated in the achievement of its thesis, it is evident that a philosophy oriented 
toward objects and their mere being proposes nothing less than the annihilation of beings themselves in
their highest possibility, and because such a loss would be of great concern to philosophy, the 
philosopher can claim no indifference to the difference between being and object.
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